The purpose of this paper is to examine the economic circumstances that motivated principals in the hotel appraisal process to influence appraised hotel values. The economic circumstances are the background in which appraisals are completed and may be germane to the issue of appraisal accuracy. This paper outlines the relationships in the process and examines the specific circumstances that may have motivated the parties to influence appraised values to be different than market values. Moreover, it provides a basis for further research and empirical tests of these rela tionships.
Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to examine the economic circumstances that impacted the motivations of principals in the hotel appraisal process. This paper will describe how mffering economic circumstances may have changed the desires of the principals across periods of time, potentially changing appraised values relative to market values. T h s paper discusses how a strong economy and other circumstances influenced most principals to want appraised hotel values to be higher than market values. On the other hand, economic circumstances such as changes in tax laws or increased monitoring by federal regulators may have influenced principals to want appraised hotel values to be lower than market values.
The paper first describes the important relationships in the hotel appraisal process. A brief review of appraisal accuracy literature is provided, along with a discussion of the serious nature of the appraisal accuracy problem. The economic circumstances of three mstinct periods are detailed next, including a discussion of the importance of lenders in the appraisal and their motivations. Some descriptive data are subsequently provided and followed by conclusions and recommendations for further research.
were not explicit principals, they could provide selective or incomplete information to an appraiser in an effort to influence value. Additionally, there was no unified appraisal licensing authority that could regulate appraisers. Without an effective monitoring authority, appraisers were much more subject to the desires of the buyer, seller, and lender.
The relationshps in the process changed in 1989 because of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act (FIRREA). Buyers could no longer commission an appraisal directly if they were going to obtain financing from a federally insured lending institution. Instead, appraisals were to be commissioned by lenders, thereby making the lender the most influential party in the process. The decision to make the lender responsible for commissioning appraisals was to help solve appraisal problems. Additionally, appraisers were expected to be licensed and/or certified and to complete appraisals that met more stringent standards.
In the 1990s, however, some researchers (Rudolph, 1994; Petuck, 1996) are skeptical about whether or not federal and state regulations have effectively altered the motivations of the parties in the appraisal process regarding appraisal accuracy. Additionally, a recent survey of appraisers conducted by Smolen and Hambleton (1997) indicates that nearly 80% of appraisers reported that aggressive lenders are still asking them to change appraised values. Therefore, without the appropriate incentives to encourage accurate appraisals on a consistent basis, appraised values may be systematically hgher or lower than market values based upon the needs of the influential parties in the process. The needs of the parties may vary from time to time, depending on the prevailing economic and regulatory environment.
Literature Review
A review of the literature reveals appraisal accuracy concerns during particular time periods (such as the 1980s) without establishing similarities to or differences from other periods. Additionally, there has been only a limited amount of research completed about the agency relationshps in the appraisal process. Thus, an examination of exogenous factors affecting the motivations of the parties in the process may help explain changes in appraisal outcomes.
In a perfect steady state economy, appraised values should not differ significantly from sales prices in a systematic fashion. However, changes in economic circumstances or the regulatory environment may induce bias into t h s process. T h s is detailed by Webb (1994) who shows sign changes of differences between appraised values and sales prices of commercial properties during different time periods from 1978 through 1990. Similarly, we can examine why there are distinct time periods that involve changes in appraised values.
The 1980s period is considered distinct primarily because of the tremendous effect the 1981 Tax Reform Act had on commercial real estate markets (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), 1997). This tax law change, combined with an improving economy of [1983] [1984] , produced an environment that encouraged real estate development.
Additionally, economic conditions were also generally favorable in the late 1980s. These circumstances provided an incentive for parties in the hotel appraisal process to want appraised values to be higher than market values.
Conversely, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 largely had a negative impact on real estate returns. A study by Follain, Hendershott, and Ling (1987) details the expected impact on real estate returns because of the decelerated depreciation schedules for commercial real estate. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 also restricted the deductibility of passive losses of real estate investments. T h s change in the tax law may have had an opposite effect from the 1981 tax law change. Principals in the process may have been loolung to sell hotel properties rapidly, thereby influencing appraised hotel values to be lower than market values during the period immediately surrounding the enactment of Tax Reform Act of 1986.
Major regulatory changes affecting lendersprimarily savings and loan institutionehave been researched extensively by Kane (1989) . The problems associated with commercial lending and appraisal practices were widely publicized by the U.S. House Committee on Government Operations (1986) in a startling report. A need for federal regulation of appraisers was not only recognized by legislators, but by appraisers themselves (Dislun, Maroney, & Vickory, 1988; Duvoisin, 1988) . This led to the enactment of FIRREA in late 1989, opening a new chapter in terms of the hotel appraisal process.
FIRREA changed the appraisal landscape significantly by 1990. New appraisal standards and guidelines were to be implemented along with state licensing as described by Hicken (1991) . The Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) began cleanup operations of insolvent savings and loans by selling non-performing assets. Moreover, the Appraisal Institute was formed in 1991 to bolster confidence in the profession after much negative publicity in the late 1980s.
With all of the measures coming into effect, the appraisal environment of the early I 1990s was very different from that of the 1980s. Hanford (1994) and Petuck (1996) describe the overzealous and critical nature of commercial appraisal reviews. Appraisers were generally of the opinion that the regulatory pendulum had swung too far. This environment, however, was not to last very long.
I
By 1993, appraiser certification licensing laws had been phased in. A variety of new i banlung laws that had been enacted in previous years began to improve the condition of 6 the nation's banking system (FDIC, 1997) . Moreover, the United States was at the begin-6 k ning of an economic expansion that is still in effect today. These changes led to a more relaxed atmosphere for appraisers, with comparisons of the mid-1990s being made to the r 1980s (Petuck, 1996) . The survey by Smolen and Hambleton (1997) also reveals the gener-:.
ally pro-development attitude of lenders during this period. 
bcononzic Circumstances

Economic Circumstances 1981-1989
Based upon an examination of economic indicators, the two recessions of the early 1980s were from January through July 1980 and July 1981 through November 1982 (Rogers, 1994 . These recessions contributed to the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1981 in estate development by increasing real estate depreciation tax shelds.
The tax sheld increase, combined with the availability of large foreign and domestic commercial real estate (Roulac, 1994 commercial real estate by increasing the depreciation tax shield. In this environment, lenders such as commercial banks, thrifts, pension funds, and life insurance companies I sought to increase real estate lending. This encouraged them to have appraisals comple&d that would justify a lending decision.
In the days before FIRREA, developers could commission an appraisal themselves and then subsequently "shop" the appraisal around in search of financing. Developers, who wanted to build hotel rooms, had a vested interest in obtaining an appraised value at or above construction cost. Commercial loan officers at commercial banks and thrifts were eager to earn loan origination fees and receive the developer's business. These parties could easily influence the appraiser, who was heavily dependent on them for business. Thus, the relationships motivated developers and lenders to increase appraised values.
The Role of Lenders during the 1980s
Commercial banks and thrifts played a large role in the increase in hotel room supply and the resulting disintermediation, were forced into "gambling" on real estate projects I thrifts, were seriouslv committed to increasing the amount of commercial real estate 5 by banks in commercial real estate through the 1980s is shown in the table 2. Overall, the atmosphere of many lenders seelung higher returns via commercial real estate may have motivated lenders and others in the process to seek hgher appraised values.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 and Other Changes
By 1986, the circumstances affecting commercial real estate development began to T h s act and a subsequent improvement in economic conditions encouraged extensive 1 ---ple, one study showed a 30city average commercial office vacancy rate for 1980 to be only 4.2%, but by 1986, the vacancy rate increased to 17.2% .2 Given the large increases in new hotel construction, investors began to worry about oversupply. This oversupply had a carryover effect into the late 1980s and early 1990s, exerting downward pressure on appraised values. 
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period would have to decline between approximately 17% and 25% to maintain the rates made some investors and lenders (particularly institutional lenders) reconsider financing hotel projects. Some principals who had only become involved in the hotel business for tax purposes wanted to sell properties fast or only lend on lower-priced "bargain" properties. Economic conditions not only lowered prices, but may also have encouraged lower appraised values in the period immediately before, during, and after the Tax Reform Act of 1986 Act of (i.e., 1985 Act of -1987 .
Economic circumstances had encouraged aggressive development in most hotel markets throughout most of the 1980s. This increase in supply was beginning to exert an adverse impact on hotel operating performance by the end of the decade. The average 12% of total revenue in 1981. Despite some modest increases in occupancy during the figure subsequently fell to a low of negative 5% in 1987. The taxable income figure Additionally, commercial banks were forced to handle more real estate problems. As the decade wore on and the oversupply of commercial real estate increased, banks were foreclosing on an increasing number of mortgages secured bv commercial properties. The aggressive position of lenders, brokers, and others in the development of new 1989. T h s legslation altered the relationships between the parties in the process and got government authorities more involved in the monitoring of appraisal practices.
Economic Circumstances 199Q-1992
For thrifts and commercial banks, earlv warnings of problems with the deposit insursavings and loan insurance funds. The Federal savings and Loan Insurance corporation 1 (FSLIC) became insolvent by 1986, and the FDIC experienced two consecutive years of losses in 1988 and 1989.~ FSLIC was finally dissolved when FIRREA was enacted in August 1989.
I
FIRREA sent a signal to the nation's lending institutions that the government was i going to pursue extensive monitoring practices in the heretofore largely unmonitored " lending process. As previously stated, FIRREA intended to force appraisers to be more 1 rigorous in their analysis of properties, and for banks to be much more familiar with the appraisal process. Moreover, the legislation would like appraisals to have greater consideration in the loan approval process.
In the meantime, while new appraisal standards were being phased in during this period, economic conditions had begun to decline. Another recession began in July 1990 and lasted through March 1991. In terms of hotel values, the Hotel Motel Brokers of America (HMBA) reported the peak selling price to be $23,630 per room in 1988. Three years later, the average sales price was $18,400 per room, a decline of approximately 22%. Thus, it appears that the Brueggeman and Thibodeau study, which predicted a decline in value of between 17% and 25%, was reasonably accurate. An oversupply of hotel rooms, declining economic conditions, and uncertainty in the lending community had had a negative impact on hotel sales prices.
An examination of the changes from late 1980s to the early 1990s in hotel occupancy, average room rate, and RevPAR describes national market conditions for the hotel industry. Historical hotel operating statistics are shown in table 6. Vol. 76 (1990) , pp. 3-28.
The Jo u1-na1 of Hospitality Financial Management
As shown in table 6, 1991 was the worst year for the hotel industry in many years. Both occupancy and average room rate declined, with occupancy lower than at any time in the 1980s. Additionally, hotels were forced to cut rates to even maintain a relatively low level of occupancy. These circumstances, combined with new regulations, were impacting the motivations of the lenders to the hotel industry.
Commercial Lenders 1990-1 992
1
Commercial banks and th rifts were forced to handle an increasing amount of foreclosed real estate. The percentage of national bank assets that were RE0 had increased from .12 percent in 198; to .73 Grcent in 1990 and .89 percent in 1991. Additionally, the number of hotel failures was rising dramatically. As shown in table 5, hotel failures aver-1 aged 472 per year during the 1 By this time, the full effect of FIRREA had been felt. In August 1990, government regulations stipulated that for appraisal purposes, an outside appraiser was to be hired directly by the financial institution or its designated agent. The appraiser was expected to have no direct or indirect in1 :erest in the property being appraised. Additionally, banks were to begin using state certified or licensed appraisers no later than December 31,1992 1 (Hicken, 1991) .
Commercial bank officers were very much aware that they were being scrutinized carefully after FIRREA was enacted. here was pressure on banks that owned hotels to sell them to satisfy federal regulators and "get them off the books." A low appraisal could help sell the property more quickly and give the impression of bank management competency if the sales prices of assets were above appraised values.
In addition, banks that we !re providing financing for buyers were also cautious and wanted to decrease exposure by lowering loan amounts via lower appraisals and by requiring increased equity contributions from buyers. Commercial lenders have long been aware that increasing loan-to-value ratios exemplifies risky behavior (Von Furstenberg, 1970) . Banks wanted to demonstrate to federal regulators a decrease in risky behavior because of the increased monitoring from federal regulators.
In an agency theory context, an agent may take actions in his best economic interest even if they are detrimental to the principal. By the early 1990s, the agents (the bank owner and managers) were well aware that principals (the depositors and the deposit insurance fund) were monitoring them to ensure outcomes in the agents' best interests. In t h s case, that meant talung actions to reduce loan losses and depletion of the deposit insurance fund.
Regulatory forbearance was a policy where federal regulators kept insolvent banks open in hopes of not disrupting the banking system and thinlung that economic conditions would improve to rescue insolvent banks. The regulatory forbearance policy of the 1980s was also applied to savings and loans in the southwestern United States, particularly Texas (Cole, 1993) . However, the FDIC, which closed relatively few banks in the early and mid 1980s, began to close a large number of banks during the late 1980s and into the early 1990s. The number of closings is shown in table 7. Additional evidence of monitoring the agents at banks is an examination of the number of Compliance Enforcement Actions initiated by the FDIC during the early 1990s. These actions include cease and desist orders, removal of bank officers, and termination of deposit insurance. The historical record of these actions is shown in table 8. The large increase of enforcement actions in the early 1990s was a warning to bank officers. Additionally, appraisers were also aware of the new scrutiny and were wary of providing overly aggressive values above sales prices. Based on the increased monitoring by federal agencies and the new appraisal regulations, the preceding evidence may indicate that principals in the process were wary of hotel investment during the 1990-92 period, pushing appraised values below market values.
Institutional Lenders 1990-1 992
Pension funds and life insurance companies were also becoming aware of market conditions for commercial real estate. The decreases in real estate returns due to the 1986 tax law were considered soon afterwards by Brueggeman and Thibodeau (1987) and have already been discussed. The performance of real estate assets is measured by the Russell-NCREIF index, whch uses quarterly appraisals and sales data (when a property is sold) to measure performance. T h s can be used as a benchmark for the pension fund manager.
Unlike commercial banks, however, pension fund managers value the assets in their funds internally every quarter. Fund managers will commission an outside appraisal By 1987, however, institutional managers had become concerned about the oversupply of real estate and the overvaluation of assets. Salomon Brothers, for example, issued a report in 1986 that discussed the overvaluation of office buildings. The Russell/NCREIF index h t a peak in 1986, with the ratio of market value to replacement cost being nearly equal (i.e., "1"). Declines in the index began in 1987. One study estimated that office buildings were overvalued by approximatelv 30% during the 1986-1989 period (as compared to the Russell-NCREIF index), but the gap between the two values closed significantly by 1992 (Hendershott & Kane, 1995 ).
Fund managers had an incentive to maintain appraised values in declining markets and "smooth" real estate returns, which may have led to overappraising of assets. However, studies have been completed which compare the sales prices of properties from the I I R~~~~~~-N C R E I F database td their appraised (slues. ~l t h o u i h hotels were not included, a study showed that sales prices exceeded appraised values for all property types from 1986 through the t h r d quarter of 1987. However, the opposite was true for properties from the fourth quarter of 1987 through 1990 (Webb, 1994) .
The oversupply and overvaluation of real estate was a concern for institutional lenders. Pension fund equity investment in real estate, which slowlv began to increase during the 1980s, peaked;n i990 and began to decline steadily afterGard;. Table 9 details the decline in pension fund equity investment in real estate from 1987 through 1992. Additionally, gven the fear of "oversupply" of commercial real estate in many markets at the time, institutional investors were begnning to become wary of real estate investments. Furthermore, these lenders were able to effectively assess the likely decline in property values that was to last for an unknown period of time. As previously discussed, hotel sales values declined significantly by the early 1990s.
Given the likely decline in values and reduced returns, institutional lenders may have been seelung very low-priced investment opportunities in hotel properties and commercial real estate or perhaps rejecting them altogether by the late 1980s and early 1990s. Therefore, this would provide a motivation for a lower appraisal of a property being financed to provide maximum protection of principal or even rationale to reject the loan applicant. This may indicate that sales prices exceeded appraised values of hotels for institutional lenders during the 1990-1992 period.
Economic Circumstances 1993-1 998
Economic circumstances had begun to improve by 1993. Construction of new rooms in the U.S. was down to approximately 35,000 while profits were positive for the first time since 1985. By 1994, sales prices had increased to $19,068 per room, the hghest since 1990?
In terms of occupancy, average daily rate, and RevPAR, the hotel industry overall made dramatic increases over the later 1980s and early 1990s. As shown in Overall, the positive economic circumstances and diminished monitoring may have led to lenders influencing appraisers for higher appraised values. On the other hand, institutional lenders who were "burned" by bad commercial real estate investments in the early 1990s have shied away from extensive hotel lending despite improving economic conditions. Thus, the motivations of the principals may indeed affect appraised values relative to market values.
Descriptive Data and Analysis
A descriptive data analysis was completed to provide a preliminary assessment of the economic circumstances and their potential effect on appraised hotel values. A total of 112 appraised hotel values were gathered in conjunction with their respective market values. Since appraised values are proprietary data and not contained within a central source, the data were difficult to obtain. Therefore, the sample sizes are relatively small during certain periods of interest and must be considered carefully when interpreting the results.
The data available ranged from 1985 through 1998. An observation is considered to be the difference between the appraised value and its market values measured by (appraised value-sale priceslsales price). The sales prices of the hotels were matched to the date of appraisal using a pricing index documented by deRoos and Corgel (1996) . This method uses a hedonic price index and is considered by academics to be the most accurate way to measure changes in lodgng values over time.
The observations were examined based upon the time periods of interest and the types of lenders involved in the purchase (commercial or institutional). The periods are 19851987 (to show the impact of the 1986 Tax Reform Act); 1988-1989; 1990-1992; and 1993-1998 . Unfortunately no data were available for 1985. The descriptive data are shown in the table below. Note. These data represent the mean percentage difference between appraised hotel values and their respective sales prices. Lender type is either commercial bank or institutional lender (insurance company pension fund, etc.). A "+" indicates an appraised value to be higher than the sales price.
